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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) since this appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah
Court of Appeals on July 31,2009. (Add. at 1-4).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are detenninative of the
appeal:
1.

UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 1. Judicial powers - Courts.
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other
courts as the legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.

2.

UTAH CONST., art. VIII, §11. Judges of courts not of record.
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner, for a term, and
with qualifications provided by statute. However, no qualification may be
imposed which requires judges of courts not of record to be admitted to
practice law. The number of judges of courts not of record shall be
provided by statute.

3.

UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-12-201. Judicial appointees - Retention elections.
(1)
(a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed
retention election at the first general election held more than three
years after the judge or justice was appointed.
(b) After the first retention election:
(i) each Supreme Court justice shall be on the regular general
election ballot for an unopposed retention election every tenth
year; and
(ii) each judge of other courts shall be on the regular general
election ballot for an unopposed retention election every sixth
year.
(2)
(a) Each justice or judge of a court of record who wishes to retain
office shall, in the year the justice or judge is subject to a retention
election:
(i) file a declaration of candidacy as if a candidate for multicounty office in accordance with Section 20A-9-202; and
(ii) pay a filing fee of $50.
(b) Each justice court judge who wishes to retain office shall, in the
year the justice court judge is subject to a retention election:
(i) file a declaration of candidacy as if a candidate for county
4

(•nice in j.vordan^ \\\iu .* xtion 20 t 1-9 202; and
{i:) T'-;r ': tiling fee of S"*^.
UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-1-101. Courts of justice enumerated-Courts of
record enumerated,
(1) The following are the courts of justice of this state:
(a) the Supreme Court;
(b) the Court of Appeals;
(c) the district courts;
(d) the juvenile courts; and
(e) the justice courts.
(2) All courts are courts of record, exceptthejusti.ee courts, winch are
courts not of record.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78 A 1 104 I i isti.ee c< »i i i I ji i.dg«= :authc >rii } >.

Justice court judges:
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as
judges of courts of record;
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of
probable cause; and
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine:
(a) probable cause for any case within uicn juii>uLciioii. t4:iu
(b) an n/v.nsrYi n-r^m's release on bail Mr b 1 - ^x Ti ,v>cogni \wu\
UTAH C'ODH AMV £~8A-2-J01 , PH\A ct^ - »f fvcry court.
Every court has authority to.
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized
to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders,, and process, and. to the
orders of a judge out of court, in. a pending action, or proceeding;
(5) control, in furtherance ofjusti.ee the conduct of its "ministerial officers,
and. of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding
before it in every matter;
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or
rr-- needing, as provided by. law;
Ki j administer oaths in a pending action ui pio-wceuiiig. and in all. other
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties;
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conu>rm u>\y>w ^ .- i• • o 5

(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent with
law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.
7.

UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-2-202 Courts of justice - Authority.
(1)
All courts of justice have the authority necessary to exercise their
jurisdiction
(2)
If a procedure for an action is not established, a process may be
adopted that conforms with the apparent intent of the statute or rule of
procedure.

8.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-202 Justice court judges to be appointedProcedure—Retention.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Local government executive" meams:
(i) for a county:
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county
operating under the county commission or expanded
county commission form of county government;
(B) the county executive in a county operating under
the county executive-council form of county
government; and (C) the county manager in a county
operating under the council-manager form of county
government; and
(ii) for a city or town:
(A) the mayor of the city or town; or
(B) the city manager, in the council-manager form of
government described in Subsection 10-3b-103(6).
(b) "Local legislative body" means:
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council;
and
(ii) for a city or town, the council of the city or town.
(2) There is created in each county a county justice court nominating
commission to review applicants and make recommendations to the
appointing authority for a justice court position. The commission shall be
convened when a new justice court judge position is created or when a
vacancy in an existing court occurs for a justice court located within the
county.
(a) Membership of the justice court nominating commission shall be
as follows:
(i) one member appointed by:
6

(A) the county commission if the county has a county
commission form of government; or
(B) the county executive if the county has an
executive-council form of government;
(ii) one member appointed by the municipalities in the
counties as follows:
(A) if the county has only one municipality,
appointment shall be made by the governing authority
of that municipality; or
(B) if the county has more than one municipality,
appointment shall be made by a municipal selection
committee composed of the mayors of each
municipality in the county;
(iii) one member appointed by the county bar association; and
(iv) two members appointed by the governing authority of the
jurisdiction where the judicial office is located.
(b) If there is no county bar association, the member in Subsection
(2)(a)(iii) shall be appointed by the regional bar association. If no
regional bar association exists, the state bar association shall make
the appointment.
(c) Members appointed under Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (ii) may not
be an elected official of the county or municipality.
(d) The nominating commission shall submit at least two names to
the appointing authority of the jurisdiction expected to be served by
the judge. The local government executive shall appoint a judge
from the list submitted and the appointment ratified by the local
legislative body.
(e) The state court administrator shall provide staff to the
commission. The Judicial Council shall establish rules and
procedures for the conduct of the commission.
(4) Selection of candidates shall be based on compliance with the
requirements for office and competence to serve as a judge.
(5) Once selected, the Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to
hold office upon successful completion of the orientation program.
(6) The selection of a person to fill the office of justice court judge is
effective upon certification of the judge by the Judicial Council. A justice
court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the Judicial
Council.
(7) Upon the expiration of a justice court judge's term of office, the judge
shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in the county or counties
7

in which the court to which the judge is appointed is located, in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201.
(8) Before each retention election, each justice court judge shall be
evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program
established in Subsection 78A-2-104(5).
§ 78A-7-208. Temporary justice court judge.
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority
may appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the
judicial district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice
court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under
rule of the Supreme Court.
UTAH CODE ANN.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 65B.
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF.
(a) Availability of Remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful
restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of
public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use
of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by
the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ.
Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall
govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent
that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions
for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth
elsewhere in these rules.
(d) Wrongful Use of Judicial Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty;
Actions by Board of Pardons and Parole.
(1) Who May Petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may
petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B)
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust
or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency,
corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment
8

of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where
the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or
failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law.
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse
party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other
person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or
other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(4) Scope of Review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial
in nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to
determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its
authority.
11.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 29. DISABILITY
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE OR CHANGE OF VENUE.
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before
whom a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge
of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council, upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial,
but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute
judge can proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a
new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before
whom a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of
the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge
assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those
duties.
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that
the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit
stating facts sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest.
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but
not later than 20 days after the last of the following:
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise
9

of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the
motion is based. If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a
hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable.
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule
11, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to
the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one
motion to disqualify in an action.
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall,
without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the
motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall take no further
action in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion,
the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no
presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign
another judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases
shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138.1 The presiding
judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like
jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as
the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are
timely filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge
shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding
judge or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment
injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5138.
(c)(3)(B) In deterniining issues of fact or of laiw, the reviewing judge may
consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge
who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to
questions posed by the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely
manner.
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is
pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth
facts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit
are true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the
objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred
1 Despite UCA §78-5-138's inclusion in Rule 29 of URCrP, this statute has been
replaced by UCA §78A-7-208.
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forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied that
the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to the alleged
prejudice.
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of
record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge
who shall hear the case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES OF THE CASE
The Appellee submits the following alternative statement of the issues of the case
and standard of review:
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in dismissing the petition for

extraordinary relief when finding Judge David Marx was legally appointed as a
justice court judge in Box Elder County? (Applt. App. at 14-17, 18-19).
Alternative Standard of Review.

"While the decision to grant or deny

extraordinary relief is within the district court's discretion," the legal reasoning of
the court is reviewed for correctness." Hogs R. Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT
21at^[6.
2.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in dismissing the petition for

extraordinary relief when finding that Judge David Marx had authority and did not
exceed his jurisdiction while acting as a temporary justice court judge in Box
Elder County? (Applt. App. at 14-17,18-19).
Alternative Standard of Review:

"While the decision to grant or deny

extraordinary relief is within the district court's discretion," the legal reasoning of
11

the court is reviewed for correctness." Hogs R. Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT
21atTf6.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petition for extraordinary relief arises out of the Petitioner's request to nullify
Judge Marx's appointment as temporary judge in Petitioner's criminal misdemeanor case.
(Applt. App. at 3-13). The Petitioner was cited on or about July 14, 2008 by Animal
Control Officer Vickie Chidester for excessive dogs or cats on property, domestic fowl
running at large, and Nuisance. (Add. at 5). Petitioner appeared, pled not guilty to the
charges, and submitted an appearance of counsel. (Applt. App. at 3-13).

Petitioner

likewise submitted a motion to recuse Box Elder Justice Court Judge Kevin Christensen.
Id. Judge Christensen granted the Petitioner's recusal motion. (Applt. App. at 14-17).
Judge Marx was assigned the case by the Box Elder Justice Court, based upon his
standing as a temporary judge holding office within the judicial district. Id.
Petitioner then submitted his petition for extraordinary relief on or about
December 1, 2009. (Applt. App. at 1-13).
On December 8, 2008, the chair of the Box Elder County Commission appointed
First District Justice Court Judge David Marx and Commission subsequently ratified the
appointment of Judge Marx as a temporary judge for the Box Elder Justice Court. (Applt.
App. at 14-17,22-35).
On or about June 15, 2009, the District Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for
extraordinary relief. (Applt. App. at 14-17).
12

The underlying criminal misdemeanor case has not been scheduled for trial in the
justice court, at the request of the Petitioner, pending the outcome of this appeal. (Add. at
6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Rule 65B of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, extraordinary relief may be
available "[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available."
"Appropriate relief may be granted where an inferior court, administrative agency, or
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion."
URCP Rule 65B(d)(2). The District Court was correct in dismissing the petition for
extraordinary relief because Judge Marx was properly appointed as a temporary judge in
Box Elder County. Utah state law provides that an appointing authority may appoint a
temporary judge to handle conflict cases when the justice court judge is disqualified or
absent. UCA §78A-7-208. The appointing authority is the local government executive,
which for a county may be chair of the county commission, county executive, or county
manager, depending upon the form of county government, or for a city or town, is the
mayor. The Box Elder County Commission appointed Judge Marx as a temporary judge
to assist with conflict cases for the Box Elder Justice Court. The County's appointment
grants Judge Marx the proper authority and jurisdiction to reside over Petitioner's
pending misdemeanor case and other cases he may be assigned as a result of the absence
or conflict.

13

The District Court dismissal of the petition for extraordinary relief is further
correct because Judge David Marx did not exceed his jurisdiction or abuse his discretion.
Prior to his assignment of Petitioner's misdemeanor case and appointment, Judge Marx
was a First District justice court judge. As a justice court judge in the First District
Judiciary, Judge Marx met the qualification requirements to be deemed a temporary
judge under Utah law, previously certified by the Judicial council and recommended by
the county attorney.
In light of the County's appointment of Judge Marx, the petition for extraordinary
relief should be denied because Petitioner lacks standing and the nature of the relief
sought is moot. No palpable or distinct injury is found in the record as a result of the
County's appointment of Judge Marx, nor is there sufficient public interest warranting
the nullification of Judge Marx's alleged prior rulings not found in the record. Further,
the Judge Marx subsequent appointment cures any alleged defect found at the time
Petitioner acquiesced to his appointment as a substitute judge, making the requested relief
moot.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court was Correct in Dismissing the Petition for
Extraordinary Relief Because Box Elder County Commission Properly
Appointed Judge David Marx as a Temporary Justice Court Judge.
Pursuant to Rule 65B(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "where no other

plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds" identified in the rule. Rule 65B(d) addresses
14

the wrongful use of judicial authority and the failure to comply with judicial duty.
Specifically, Rule 65B(d) states:
Appropriate relief may be granted (A) where an inferior court... exceeded
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court... has
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust, or station;
(C) where the an inferior court... has refused the petitioner the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled....
Courts reviewing claims of the wrongful use of judicial authority are directed to "look to
the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose
of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant extraordinary relief.9' State v.
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^[11 (citing Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677,
683 (Utah 1995)).
"Rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief is available upon a showing that the lower court
abused its discretion. Barrett, 2005 UT at ^[26. "A court faced with a petition for
extraordinary relief will consider multiple factors when determining whether or not to
grant the relief requested in the petition." Id. at f24. The court's exercise of its5
discretion "when deciding whether to grant or withhold relief is akin to the court's
exercise of its certiorari review powers." Id. Among the 'special and important reasons'
for consideration is whether "a panel of the court of appeals 'has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ... as to
call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.'" Id. (quoting Rule
46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).

15

The alleged abuse of discretion asserted by Petitioner pertains to the appointment
requirements of a temporary justice court judge. The appointment of temporary justice
court judge is governed by statute. Utah law provides:
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial
district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge
may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the
Supreme Court.
UCA §78A-7-208. The "appointing authority" is the local executive, which means; for a
county, the chair of the county commission, the county executive, or the county manager,
depending upon the form of the county form of government, or for a city or two, the
mayor. UCA §78A-7-202(l)(a), (2)(d). The local legislative body is to ratify the
appointment. UCA §78A-7-202(2)(d). The local legislative body for a county is the
county commission or county council, or for a city or town, the city or town council.
UCA §78A-7-202 (l)(b).
Here, the chair of the Box Elder County Commission appointed First District
Justice Court Judge David Marx on December 8, 2008, and the Commission ratified the
appointment the same day. (Applt. App. 22-35). Brigham City's case against Petitioner
was pending prior to Judge Marx's appointment and remains pending today. (Add. at 5,
6). Therefore, Box Elder County Commission's appointment of Judge David Marx meets
the requirements necessary to appoint a temporary justice court judge for the County and
Judge Marx may serve as a temporary justice court judge over the case.

16

While Petitioner's asserts additional requirements are necessary to complete the
appointment process for temporary judges, Petitioner confuses the requirements for a
temporary judge with newly appointed judicial officer not holding judicial office.
Petitioner claims that Judge Marx's appointment must be voided because the local
legislative body failed to submit his appointment to the Judicial Council and the Judicial
Council failed to certify his qualifications to hold office. Petitioner's assertion that a
certificate from the Judicial Council is necessary prior to a temporary justice court judge
may exercise jurisdiction is not based upon the governing statute, UCA §78A-7-208.
(Applt. Bf. at 10-11). Moreover, the additional requirements are unnecessary. Appointed
temporary judges already hold judicial office or have retired in good standing within the
judicial district. It is inferred, based on Judge Marx's standing as a current judge in the
judicial district that he may exercise judicial authority upon appointment, absent
presentment to the Judicial Council, because he already core judicial functions and
qualifies to perform judicial opinions on disqualification motions for the County under
Rule 29 of Utah Rules of Criminal procedures. To require a county to confirm the
qualifications of a judicial officer within the same judicial district, already deemed in
good standing with the Judicial Council, serves no legitimate legislative purpose.
Petitioner further argues that Judge Marx's appointment should be voided because
the appointment was not accompanied by a written opinion from the county attorney.
Such a requirement is also unnecessary and serves no legitimate legislative purpose. The
requirements necessary to hold a judicial office are the same in Cache County as they are
17

in Box Elder County. Judge David Marx was previously appointed as a First District
Judicial Officer and has performed functions within the district. Judge Marx was
appointed following the presentation and explanation of the Box Elder County Attorney.
(Applt. App. 22-35). To require a county attorney to submit a written decision to the
Judicial Council for them to review the qualifications of a judicial officer already holding
office within the judicial district prior to his/her appointment as a temporary judge is
overly burdensome and unnecessary.
Petitioner next contends that the appointment of Judge Marx by the County fails
because the Box Elder County Commission failed to include the duration of the
temporary appointment. UCA §78A-7-208; UCA §20A-12-201. A temporary judge is
appointed only in the limited context of the absence, or disqualification of the assigned
judge. UCA §78A-7-208. The intent of the statute is to grant extended authority and
subject matter jurisdiction for experienced judicial officers for the limited purpose of
assisting with conflict cases. The ability to appoint a retired judge as a temporary judge
negates the Petitioner's argument that retention election constitutes a limitation for the
duration for the temporary judicial officers.
In this case, Judge Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case at the
request of Petitioner. (Appl. App. at 14-17). Petitioner filed the motion to recuse Judge
Christensen and Judge Marx was subsequently appointed. (Appl. App. at 14-17). The
County's appointment temporary appointment is therefore complete and whether
Petitioner's misdemeanor case takes three to five years to reach a trial or sentence, the
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appointment of Judge Marx should remain so long has he is maintains his office as a
justice court judge within the judicial district, remains in good standing with the Judicial
Council, and Box Elder County Commission approves of the appointment.2
In conclusion, the appointment of a Judge Marx as temporary justice court judge
was completed on December 8, 2008, when the chair of the County Commission,
appointed Judge Marx and the appointment was ratified the Commission by a majority
vote. It is unnecessary to require counties5 to submit the qualification of a judge
currently holding judicial office within the judicial district to the Judicial Council, or to
require the county attorney to submit an opinion as to the qualifications of said judicial
officer appointed as a temporary judge. It is further not required by statute to withhold an
appointment until the Judicial Council submits a separate certificate for each municipality
or county in the district that appoints a temporary judge for conflict purposes. With the
appointment completed on December 8, 2008, Judge Marx's assignment as a conflict
judge, in accordance with Rule 29 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah law
should remain.

2 Presumably, Judge Marx may retain his appointment as a temporary judge on
Petitioner's case if he retires within the judicial district. However, if Judge Marx
transfers or assumes another justice court judgeship outside of the judicial district, Judge
Marx no longer qualifies as for the temporary judgeship appointment under UCA §78A7-208.
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II.

The District Court Was Correct in Dismissing the Petition for Extraordinary
Relief Because Judge David Marx was Qualified and Acted Within his
Jurisdiction and Authority when Assigned Petitioner's Pending Misdemeanor
Case.
Justice courts in Utah are created by statute and hold the authority necessary to

exercise their jurisdiction and may adopt procedures to confirm with the apparent intent
of the statute or rule of procedure. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 1; UCA §78A-1-101; UCA
§78A-2-202. Indeed, Article VIII, Section 1, vests judicial power in courts, not in judges.
A justice court's authority includes the authority to "compel obedience to its judgments,
orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court...." UCA §78A-2-201. A
court's authority begins with the premise "[sjubject matter jurisdiction is the authority
and competency of the court to decide the case." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844,
852-53 (Utah 1994). A justice court, maintaining subject matter jurisdiction, likewise
maintains authority to proceed in disqualification motions smd receive orders of a judge
transferred the case.
Judges exercising the justice court's jurisdiction must likewise have authority and
qualifications to reside over a case. Id; UCA §78A-7-104. The selection of judges to a
justice court is governed by statute. UTAH CONST., art. VII], § 11. As outlined above,
Utah law provides that a temporary judge is qualified to perform core judicial functions
injustice courts, so long as they are a justice court judge within the judicial district, or a
retired judge appointed by the appointing authority. Legislative authority, however,
"does not extend to a legislative body the discretion to determine who has the authority to
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exercise that jurisdiction." Ohms, 881 P.2d at 853. Thus, the local legislative body
appointment process should not be extended to create discretion to appoint a temporary
judge for each individual misdemeanor case wherein the judge is deemed absent or
disqualified.
Justice courts are likewise provided authority to adopt procedures in harmony with
the apparent intent of the statute or rule of procedure, including the authority to transfer
cases and arrange for substitute judges. UCA §78A-2-202. The procedure to transfer a
justice court case is outlined by Rule 29 of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the assignment of justice court case
be in accordance with Utah's law governing the appointment of temporary justice court
judges. URCrP Rule 29(c)(2).
Here, the assignment of the Petitioner's misdemeanor case was made after
Petitioner moved to recuse Judge Christensen. (Applt. App. 14-17). Judge Christensen
granted the motion and the case was assigned Judge Marx. Id. At the time of the
assignment, Judge Marx was a qualified First District justice court judge serving in Hyde
Park and North Logan, Utah. Id. Shortly after the recusal motion was granted, Box Elder
County was notified by the Administrative Office of the Court that Judge Marx required
the appointment by the applicable appointing authority. (Applt. App. 22-35). On
December 8, 2008, the appointment of Judge Marx was completed.
Notwithstanding the appointment by the County Commission and pursuit of a
Rule 29 disqualification motion by Petitioner, Petitioner contends that Judge Christensen
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unlawfully delegating away his judicial power by appointing a non-judicial officer,
similar to Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 147 (Utah App 1992). (Applt. Br. 18-22). The
ruling in Holm's is distinguishable from this case because the appointment of a
commissioner is dissimilar to the justice court's attempts to grant a Rule 29 recusal
motion by transferring the case to a qualified judicial officer within the judicial district.
Judges holding office within the judicial district are qualified to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties and questions presented in litigation. Moreover,
Rule 29 envisions the reliance of judges within the judicial district. There is no evidence
that Judge Christensen knowingly transferred a case to a non-judicial officer or attempted
to purposefully avoid the appointment process by transferring Petitioner's case to nonjudicial officer exempt from accountability. Rather, Judge Christensen assigned
Petitioner's case to a qualified judicial officer, with experience to address issues in
Petitioner's misdemeanor case.
Judge Christensen further agreed with the Box Elder County Attorney that the
appointment process was required by the Box Elder County Commission to complete the
assignment of conflict cases when he became aware of the incomplete appointment of
Judge Marx. (Applt. App. 22-35). Upon receiving notice of the need to appoint Judge
Marx as a temporary justice court judge in Box Elder County, Judge Marx was properly
appointed. Given his appointment, Judge Marx holds authority to exercise the
assignment of Petitioner's pending misdemeanor case, including the authority to address
any pending pre-trial motions asserted by Petitioner.
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The ratification of the assignment of Petitioner's misdemeanor case by the
appointing authority is permissible. Petitioner's unpublished case, Kasteler v. Gibbons,
2007 UT App 267 (unpublished) supports the premise that the appointment by a
substitute judge, by the proper appointing authority, nullifies a petition challenging the
transfer of a case to a properly appointed, qualified judge. (Add. 7-8). The facts in
Kasteler state that the entire case was first transferred to a neighboring jurisdiction (the
Holladay Justice Court) and a substitute judge (Judge Daniel Gibbons), rather than
keeping the case within the jurisdiction. Id. Finding that the initial petition for
extraordinary directed the appointing authority to appoint a substitute judge (Judge
Virginia Ward), in accordance with UCA §78-5-138 (renumbered as UCA 78A-7-208),
the Kasteler Court denied additional challenges to the appointment of the temporary
judge. Id. Similar to the direction in Kasteler, the Box Elder County Attorney secured
the appointment of a temporary judge in Petitioner's case in the jurisdiction maintaining
authority. Following the appointment of Judge Marx, Petitioner's requested relief has
been granted and no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy remains outstanding. The
Court should therefore deny the petition for extraordinary relief.
Petitioner makes numerous claims that Judge Marx made "rulings, orders,
judgments, assessed fines, assessed penalties, jail time, or other legal activities prior to
his appointment, in abuse of his jurisdiction and the Court's discretion, which are not
included in the record. (Applt. Br. 16-27). Absent a record, Petitioner fails to provide any
specific facts to support his claims.
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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7), of the Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, "[a]ll
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations
to the record...." Rule 24(a)(9) also indicates that "[t]he argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court...." "The combined
effect of these rules is to require that parties on appeal make well-reasoned legal
arguments supported by specific facts of record." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006
UT 27 at T[32. Absent any specific record of the rulings, orders, judgments, fines,
penalties, jail time or other legal activities prior to his appointment, the Petitioner fails to
present any credible record which enable a response because multiple municipalities use
the Box Elder Justice Court, including Brigham City and Perry City. On the record
submitted, Petitioner notes there is nofine,penalty, jail time or adverse judgment entered
against Petitioner. Due to Petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence, Petitioner's claims
should be denied.
Notwithstanding the failure to submit a record of any rulings, orders, and
judgments by Judge Marx prior to Box Elder County Commission's appointment, any
such rulings, orders and judgments should be upheld based upon Judge Marx de facto
authority. A judge de facto is defined as:
One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful
authority and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the
office, as where he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by
an usurper of the appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office.
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Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 853-54 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th ed.
1990)). Utah case law has defined an officer de factor as follows:
An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer,
the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third person, where the duties of the
office were exercised,
First without a known appointment or election, but under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce
people, without inquire, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to
be the officer he assumed to be,
Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but
where the officer had failed to conform to some precedent requirement or
condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like.
Third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public.
Fourth under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
Olms, 881 P.2d at 854 (citing Vance v. Fordham, p.2d 124,131 n5). Decisions by judges
de facto are binding. In In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 18 (1927), the court held
that a district court judge had, at least, de facto authority to sit with the supreme court,
given (1) the district judge had authority in other instances to site with the court, and (2)
the parties had knowledge of and did not object to the district judge's participation.
Judge Marx held de facto authority because he was transferred Petitioner's case
pursuant to Rule 29 while he held a judicial office within the judicial district. The
assignment of the Petitioner's case, in accordance with Rule 29, constitutes a
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circumstance of reputation or acquiescence calculated to induce the parties, without any
inquiry, to submit to his position as a judicial officer. Acting under the color of authority
granted him through Rule 29, Judge Marx's held de facto authority to hold pre-trial
conferences and address any matters presented by the parties prior to the Petitioner's
pending trial.
In sum, the District Court was correct in finding Judge Marx was qualified to be
assigned Petitioner's case and that he acted within his jurisdiction and authority. Judge
Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case following Petitioner's Rule 29 recusal
motion. Judge Marx met the qualification to be assigned Petitioner's case. Following his
subsequent appointment, Judge Marx may proceed with Petitioner's pending
misdemeanor case. There are no rulings, orders, or judgments presented in the record.
Notwithstanding the Petitioner's reference to facts not in the record, Judge Marx alleged
rulings prior to his appointment were cloaked with his de facto judicial authority because
the rulings stem from assignments following a transfer of a conflict case in accordance
with apparent intent of Rule 29 of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure and acquiesced by
the Petitioner.
III.

The Petitioner Lacks Standing and the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is
Moot, in light of the Box Elder County Commission's Appointment of Judge
David Marx.
Pursuant to Utah case law, "[a] petitioner for extraordinary relief must have

standing, just as any other litigant must have." Hogs R US, 2009 UT at ^|7. Petitioner
lacks standing because "no distinct and palpable injury" gives him a personal stake in the
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outcome of the legal dispute pertaining to Judge Marx's alleged rulings prior to his
appointment. Id. at | 8 . There are two means to establish standing; the tradition test and
the alternative test. Id. at ^[8 (citing Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality
Bd.9 2006 UT 74,1J18). Under the traditional test, a party has standing if, (1) the party
asserts that it has or will be adversely affected by the challenged actions, (2) a causal
relationship between the injury to the party and the challenged actions and the relief
asserted is alleged, and (3) the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury
claimed. Id. Here, the Petitioner neither alleges an injury nor presents any injury in the
record. Therefore, the Petitioner does not have any injury requiring the Court to grant his
request relief; which is the nullification of all judicial rulings, orders, and decisions of
Judge Marx prior to the appointment by the county commission. Moreover, there is no
showing that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed because there the alleged
rulings, orders and decisions do not pertain to the Petitioner. Petitioner thus lacks
standing under the traditional test.
Utah case law allows an alternative showing of standing if an appropriate party
asserts issues of sufficient public importance to balance the absence of the traditional
standing criteria. Id. at 9 (citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^[41). Petitioner's claim lacks
sufficient public importance because it does not raise a public issue that is unlikely to be
raised if the party is denied standing. Judge Marx was a qualified, justice court judge in
the district at the time of his assignment as a temporary judge for the Box Elder Justice
Court. Moreover, there are no records of any rulings, motions, or decisions warranting a
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sufficient public issue. In light of his prior position, Petitioner fails to allege a sufficient
public issue important enough to receive standing to challenge all alleged decisions of
Judge Marx prior to his appointment.
Petitioner's extraordinary relief is also moot. Where the requested judicial relief
in a Rule 65B petition can no longer affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and
a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits. Spain v. Steward, 639
P.2d 166 (Utah 1981). Petitioner does not assert any claim that the justice court "failed to
perform an act required by law" or "refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right
or office" under Rule 65B(d). Instead, Petitioner's extraordinary relief claims rests upon
the Rule 65B(d)(l), under the assertion the justice court exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion.
Petitioner's request relief is moot because the Box Elder County Commission's
adherence to UCA §78A-2-208 granted Judge Marx jurisdiction and discretion as a
temporary justice court judge. Utah law upholds mootness claims in extraordinary relief
petitions unless there is a wide concern, which affects the public interest. Anderson v.
Taylor, 2006 UT 79, tl^-l 1. There is no record to suggest that Petitioner's requested
relief affects a wide concern or public interest. There is no likelihood of any
reoccurrence of the hypothetical challenges to Judge Marx's appointment by similar
situated defendants and no legal reasoning set forth challenging any ruling or order in the
underlying criminal case by Judge Marx. Moreover, the Court should find the
Petitioner's request relief to nullify the assignment of Judge Marx to Petitioner's
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misdemeanor case moot because the subsequent appointment cured all alleged defects
presented in the record indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
The District Court was correct in dismissing the Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
Judge Marx was appointed by the chair of the Box Elder County Commission and ratified
by the majority of the commission on December 8, 2008 after Petitioner's motion to
recuse Judge Christensen was granted. Petitioner's criminal misdemeanor case remains
pending and Judge Marx's appointment as temporary judge is valid absent a presentment
to the Judicial Council because, at the time of the appointment, he held office as a justice
court judge within the judicial district
The District Court dismissal of the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is further
correct because Judge David Marx did not exceed his jurisdiction or abuse his discretion.
Judge Marx was assigned Petitioner's case following Petitioner's motion for recusal and
Judge Marx exercised his experience as a current justice court judge to hold pre-trial
conferences at the request of the parties' prior to his appointment by the County
commission. Cloaked, at a minimum with de facto judicial authority, Judge Marx did not
abuse or exceed his jurisdiction because Petitioner acquiesced to Judge Marx as a
temporary justice court judge and Box Elder County Justice Court maintained at all time
subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, Petitioner lacks standing to seek to nullify alleged judicial decisions of
Judge Marx not found in the ruling because no palpable or distinct injury is found in the
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record and the challenge to the appointment fails to constitute a sufficient public interest
warranting the nullification of alleged prior rulings. Additionally, Judge Marx
subsequent appointment cures any alleged defect found at the time Petitioner acquiesced
to his appointment as a temporary judge, making the requested relief moot.
For the forgoing reasons, the District Court's ruling should be upheld.
DATED this ^M», day of May, 2010.

By:
BOtf ELDER C O U N * ATTORNEY

<~>azS-

DATED this 2f

, day of May 2010.

By:
BRIGHAM CITY ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this JXM^day of May, 2010, two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing brief BRIEF OFAPPELLEE BOX ELDER COUNTY AND BRIGHAM
CITY were sent via postage prepaid, first class U.S. mail to:
Charles A. Schultz
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for Appellant
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY

'
Stephen R. Hadfield
Attorney for Appellee Box Elder County
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CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
222 W 700 S
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302
RE: Pett v. Brigham City Corp

Appellate Case No. 20090620

Dear Mr. SCHULTZ:
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has been
filed with the Utah Supreme Court. The case number is 20090620
and should be indicated on future filings and correspondence.
Included with this notice is an order transferring the case to
the Utah Court of Appeals within twenty days. The order remains
in effect, unless, within 10 calendar days of the date of the
order letters are received advising the Supreme Court why they
should retain the case.
Effective July 1, 2009, the transcript request may be ordered on
line by going to the court's web site www.utcourts.gov and
selecting "Of Interest to the Public Community" and "Request a
Transcript".
If you have a question regarding a transcript you may contact:
Nicole Gray, (801) 238-7975, nicoleg@email.utcourts.gov
Ashlee MacEwen, (801) 578-3947, ashleemgemail.utcourts.gov
Lisa Collins, (801) 578-3907, lisaac@email.utcourts.gov
This court will permit documents of 10 pages (including
attachments) or less that do not require a filing fee to be filed
by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile of the
required signature, will be accepted as an "original1' document
until the true original and any required copies are received by
the court. The original must be received bv this court within 5
AHHpnrliim

nc.01

business days from the^date of the transmission by fax. If the
original is not received1 within that period, the court will .treat
the filing as void. A faxed filing is considered "received"" when
stamped by the clerk's office. The time for stamping is limited
to regular office hours (weekdays 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.). All
risks associated with filing by fax are borne by the sender. The
fax number for this court is 578-3999.
The Docketing Statement and attachments, consisting of the
original and two copies, is due within twenty-one (21) days of
the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore,
the docketing statement is due August 18, 2009.
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the
appeal process may result in dismissal of the appeal.

Susan Willis
Judicial Services Manager
cc:

MICHAEL E CHRISTIANSEN
STEPHEN R HADFIELD
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY, 080101282
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FILED

LiTA^ APPELLATE COURTJ
L 5

00O00

- - *'''

JUL 3 1 2009
Robert Pett,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
Brigham City Corporation;
Box Elder County Corporation;
and David Marx,

Case No. 20090620-SC

Respondents and Appellees.

ORDER
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
effective twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Thereafter,
all further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that
Court. Prior to the effective date of the transfer, this Court is
willing to consider retaining this matter on its own docket.
Accordingly, any party to the appeal may submit a letter to the Court
regarding the appropriateness of retention. The letter shall contain
the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading
describing each category:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The name of the case and the appellate case number
The names of all parties involved in the case and the
attorneys and firms representing the parties.
A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal
A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or
transfer.

The letter shall not exceed five pages and must be received within ten
calendar days of the date of this order. In the event the tenth day
falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the
first business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer.
FOR THE

Qj*» &, &Q09

AHHpnHnm

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

nrr AQ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July _jH__, 2009, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
MICHAEL E CHRISTIANSEN
MANN HADFIELD & THORNE
98 N MAIN
PO BOX 876
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302-0876
CHARLES A SCHULTZ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
222 W 700 S
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84 302
STEPHEN R HADFIELD
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
9 W FOREST ST STE 310
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84 302
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY
ATTN: SHAUNA / HOLLIE
PO BOX 873
4 3 N MAIN
BRIGHAM CITY UT 8 4 3 0 2 - 0 8 7 3

Susan W i l l i s
J u d i c i a l S e r v i c e s Manager
Case No. 20090620-SC
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY,
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BOX ELDER COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
01 SOUTH MAIN ST.
JBRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
(435) 734-3390
BRIGHAM CITY,
Plaintiff

RULING ON MOTION
Case No 081002646

Vs
Judge

David Marx

ROBERT JENSEN FETT,
Defendant
ORDER
The motion and request for decision pertaining to the above referenced case has been
reviewed by the court The case was stricken from the court's calendar on February 11,
2010
The decision of the court is to order the jury trial postponed at the Defendant's request,
and continue the case without date

I/I
/cZ~

Date

Judge David Marx-

/

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I [ ] hand-delivered [X] mailed via first class I
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Ruling on Motion to Postpone Jury
Michael E Christiansen
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Todd KASTELER, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
Honorable Daniel B GIBBONS, Robert D. Gray, Honorable Virginia Ward, Casey Fttts, Bill Anderson,
Marilyn Brusch, Rea Goddard, Mike Rutter, Shane Siwik, and John Weaver, Respondents and
Appellees.
No. 20070345-CA.
Aug. 2, 2007.
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 070900875; The Honorable Tyrone E Medley.
Todd Kasteler, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se.
Janice L Frost, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
H Craig Hall and Jennifer A. Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Daniel B. Gibbons.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and McHUGH.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
* i Appellant Todd Kasteler appeals an order dismissing his second emergency petition for
extraordinary relief. This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.
Kasteler was charged with driving on a suspended license in South Salt Lake. Because some
witnesses were court employees, South Salt Lake Justice Court Judge Catherine M. Johnson recused
herself after Kasteler filed a motion to disqualify. Judge Johnson transferred Kasteler's cases to the
Holladay Justice Court and purported to appoint Judge Daniel Gibbons of the latter court as the
substitute judge. Judge Denise Lindberg's ruling on Kasteler's original emergency petition for
extraordinary relief vacated the appointment and directed the South Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a
substitute judge to hear the cases, specifically citing Utah Code section 78-5-138. See Utah Code
Ann S 78-5-138 (2002V The mayor appointed Salt Lake City Justice Court Judge Virginia Ward to sit
as a temporary judge for the South Salt Lake Justice Court.
Kasteler filed a second emergency petition for extraordinary relief, which was assigned to Judge
Tyrone Medley. Kasteler claimed that: (1) Judge Daniel Gibbons was required to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction; (2) the South Salt Lake Mayor was required to comply with Utah Code section 785-134f2) in appointing a temporary justice court judge; and (3) Judge Virginia Ward exceeded her
jurisdiction in setting an arraignment because there had been no review of his motion to disqualify
Judge Johnson by a reviewing judge under rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge
Medley dismissed the second emergency petition, ruling that it was moot "in substantial part" and
that Kasteler failed to demonstrate that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy through
either an appeal of Judge Lindberg's ruling or proceedings to enforce that ruling. This appeal is limited
to a review of Judge Medley's ruling.
Judge Medley did not err in ruling that the second emergency petition was moot in substantial part
because the issues were resolved in Judge Lindberg's ruling on the original petition. The assertion
that it is necessary for Judge Gibbons to dismiss Kasteler's cases is without merit because the cases
remain pending in the South Salt Lake Justice Court where they originated. Similarly, Kasteler's oft
repeated assertion that appointment of a temporary, substitute justice court judge must comply with

the same procedures as for appointment of a permanent judge is without merit. Utah Code section
78-5-138 was referenced in Judge Lindberg's ruling as the procedure for appointment of a substitute
judge under the circumstances. That statute states:
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may appoint another
justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial district to serve as a temporary justice
court judge. A retired justice court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge
under rule of the Supreme Court.
* 2 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. The statute governs the temporary appointment of a justice court
judge when the assigned judge has been disqualified, which is precisely what occurred in this case
upon Judge Johnson's recusal. We note that Kasteler did not appeal any part of Judge Lindberg's
ruling.
Kasteler's assertion that there must be further review of his motion to disqualify Judge Johnson is
frivolous. Judge Johnson did not dispute the motion to disqualify and instead chose to recuse. No
further review is required by rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure because the motion was
effectively granted.
Judge Medley did not err in dismissing the second emergency petition for extraordinary relief.
Judge Lindberg's ruling on the original emergency petition granted the relief requested and addressed
Kasteler's legitimate procedural concerns. The underlying cases remain pending in South Salt Lake,
and the mayor appointed Judge Ward as a substitute judge in accordance with section 78-5-138. If
Judge Ward has since elected not to participate, as suggested in the responses, the South Salt Lake
Mayor should appoint another substitute judge in accordance with section 78-5-138. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Utah App.,2007.
Kasteler v. Gibbons
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